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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey year, according to a Westlaw search, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rendered 2252 opinions.
However, only 375 of these opinions were "published," which is
consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's recent trend of sharply limiting
the number of published decisions. The court's view on this issue is
illustrated by Internal Operating Procedure ("IOP") 5 in Eleventh Circuit
Rule 36-2':
The unlimited proliferation of published opinions is undesirable
because it tends to impair the development of the cohesive body of law.
To meet this serious problem it is declared to be the basic policy of this
court to exercise imaginative and innovative resourcefulness in
fashioning new methods to increase judicial efficiency and reduce the
volume of published opinions.'
The Eleventh Circuit applies this policy with vigor, perhaps to the
disappointment of lawyers looking for helpful authority to cite when
appearing before the Eleventh Circuit or the district courts within the
circuit. The problem, if it can be called a problem, is exacerbated by the
fact that a significant percentage of published opinions are cases that
raise issues about aliens, particularly the deportation of aliens, and
federal sentencing guidelines. These may well be areas of the law that
are in need of precedential guidance, but lawyers looking for published
cases addressing more traditional issues like evidence will find relatively
few cases.
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The end result, or at least the end result for those writing survey
articles on Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions, is that there is not much
to write about, making this Article the shortest of the Author's twentyone Eleventh Circuit evidence survey articles.
In addition to limiting the number of published opinions, some circuits
have forcefully discouraged litigants from citing unpublished opinions.
The Eleventh Circuit never quite went this far, but an earlier version of
its IOP made clear that "[rieliance on unpublished opinions is not
favored by the court."' Many argued that courts should not be allowed
to restrict citations to their unpublished opinions.
The Judicial
Conference agreed and proposed a rule prohibiting any court from
enacting a rule barring parties from citing to unpublished opinions.4
Newly adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1' provides that
courts may not prohibit the citation of unpublished federal judicial
decisions issued on or after January 1, 2007.6 Currently, the Eleventh
Circuit allows the citation of unpublished opinions as persuasive
authority but not as binding precedent.7

II.

ARTICLE

IV.

RELEVANCY

8

Federal Rule of Evidence 404 is the principal rule governing the
admissibility of "extrinsic act evidence"-evidence of acts and transactions other than the one at issue-offered for substantive, as opposed to
impeachment, purposes.9 Rule 404 is intended to prevent the admission
of evidence of prior misconduct offered solely to prove that a defendant
is more likely to have committed the charged offense. 10 This evidence
is sometimes called "propensity evidence"" and is generally not
admissible to prove the defendant's propensity to commit a criminal
act. 12 The Eleventh Circuit applies a three-part test, sometimes called
the Beechum test, to determine the admissibility of extrinsic act

3. 11TH CiR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5 (2000).
4. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate
Rules to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure
(May, 6, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2005.pdf.
5. FED. R. App. P. 32.1.
6. Id.
7. 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 I.O.P. 6.
8. FED. R. EVID. 404.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. For a more detailed discussion of propensity evidence see Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2005).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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evidence. 13 First, the extrinsic act evidence "must be relevant to an
issue other than the defendant's character." 4 Second, the prosecution
must prove the defendant committed the extrinsic act.'5 Third, the
evidence must survive a Rule 40316 balancing test, 17 meaning the
probative value of the extrinsic act evidence must be substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 8 However, Rule 404(b) provides
that extrinsic act evidence may be admitted to prove matters such as
motive, preparation, knowledge, intent, scheme, or plan. 9
Viewed in a practical light, it is easy to understand why Rule 404(b)
restricts the admission of extrinsic act evidence. In a close case,
evidence that a defendant has committed or likely committed other
crimes can have a huge impact on jurors. If a defendant committed
prior drug offenses, jurors may think he or she is more likely to have
committed the charged drug offense. Indeed, it seems that prosecutors
most often resort to the use of extrinsic act evidence in drug cases. The
defense will then aggressively, but usually unsuccessfully, fight to
exclude the evidence of prior drug-related activity. In these cases, courts
typically rule that evidence of prior, supposedly similar, drug activity is
admissible to establish the defendant's intent to engage in the charged
drug activity.2° In 2005 the Eleventh Circuit briefly signaled a change

in its Rule 404(b) analysis in drug cases, holding that a plea of not guilty
does not always open the door for the admission of prior drug convictions
to prove intent. 2' However, four months after denying the government's motion to reconsider its case, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte
vacated the decision.22 The court issued a per curiam opinion, holding
that a not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case makes the defendant's
intent a material issue that opens the door for the admission of evidence
of prior drug convictions.23

13. United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 935 (11th Cir. 1998); see United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
14. Mills, 138 F.3d at 935.
15.

Id.

16. FED. R. EVID. 403.
17. Mills, 138 F.3d at 935.
18. FED. R. EVID. 403.
19. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
20. E.g., United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
21. United States v. Matthews, 411 F.3d 1210, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated per
curiam, 431 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2005).
22. Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311.
23. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit's Rule 404(b) analysis in United States v.
Edouard24 is typical of the court's approach to extrinsic act evidence.
In this drug conspiracy case, the defendant contended that the district
court improperly admitted testimony that in 1995 and 1996 he had
imported cocaine into the United States through the use of couriers."
After applying the Beechum test, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.2 6
Under the first prong, the court noted the extrinsic act evidence was
admissible to prove the defendant's intent to engage in the charged
conspiracy." The defendant's not guilty plea made intent a material
issue and thus opened the door for the admission of extrinsic act
evidence to prove intent.2" Because the same state of mind was
required for both the conspiracy charge and the extrinsic offenses, the
extrinsic offenses were relevant to prove the defendant's attempt to
commit the charged offense.29
The second prong of the Beechum test-whether the government has
sufficiently proven the defendant committed the extrinsic offenses-appeared to be a more problematic issue for the government. ° The
defendant had not been charged and, therefore, had not been convicted
of committing the extrinsic offenses.3 " However, a conviction is not
necessary to render evidence of extrinsic offenses admissible.3 2 Rather,
the prosecution may introduce evidence of extrinsic acts if a jury would
be able to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the acts actually
occurred.33 The government's evidence consisted of testimony from the
defendant's two brothers. In exchange for possible sentence reductions,
the brothers testified that they smuggled cocaine into the United States
for the defendant on commercial airlines in return for payment. The
defendant presented no evidence to rebut this testimony.34 The
Eleventh Circuit held that this testimony was sufficient to allow a jury
to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant
committed the prior acts.35 Under the third prong of the Beechum
analysis-the Rule 403 balancing test-the defendant primarily argued

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1332, 1343.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir. 2000).
Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344-45.
Id. at 1345.
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that the extrinsic acts were too remote and different to be admissible.
His alleged prior smuggling involved human couriers, while the charged
offense alleged smuggling cocaine in cargo. 6 However, because both
schemes involved smuggling cocaine into the United States, the fact that
different means were used did not render the extrinsic acts inadmissible." The charged conspiracy allegedly began in 1998, and thus, the
1995 and 1996 activities were not too remote to be inadmissible. 8
Accordingly, because the extrinsic act evidence satisfied Rule 404(b), the
district court did not err in admitting the evidence.3 9
Similarly, in United States v.Tampas,40 the defendant contended
that the district court improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence, but
the Eleventh Circuit's brief treatment of this argument undoubtedly left
the defendant unsatisfied. In Tampas the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to commit embezzlement from a Young Men's Christian
Association ("YMCA"). The defendant, with the aid of a YMCA
employee, allegedly received payments for services that either he did not
perform or had a value substantially less than the payments he received.
The YMCA employee, who was charged as the defendant's coconspirator,
had previously been convicted of failing to remit payroll taxes. At the
defendant's trial, the government introduced evidence of the coconspirator's prior conviction. 6' The defendant contended that this evidence
was extrinsic and inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). The defendant
further argued that he had not been charged with tax related crimes, yet
the jury heard evidence that his coconspirator had committed tax
fraud.4 2 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Government did not offer
the evidence to implicate the defendant in the tax fraud scheme but to
show that because of the coconspirator's tax fraud the YMCA had funds
available to finance the kickback conspiracy.43 However, the court did
not discuss why it was relevant for the Government to show the reason
the funds were available in addition to showing that the funds were
available. The defendant likely argued that it would be sufficient to
show that the conspirators arranged for the defendant to be overpaid
and that the YMCA had resources to fund the kickback scheme. The
court did not explain why it was necessary for the jury to know that the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at

1345-46.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
493 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1301-02.
Id. at 1302.
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reason the YMCA had the cash on hand was because the defendant's
coconspirator, in addition to engaging in the kickback conspiracy, was
previously convicted of tax fraud.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Doe" is unpublished but merits discussion because it is one of the few cases in recent
years in which the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court erroneously
admitted extrinsic act evidence.45 The case also illustrates the
particularly stringent prerequisite to the admission of extrinsic act
evidence to prove identity.4 6 In Doe the defendant contended that the
district court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's prior
convictions for cocaine possession during his trial on charges of
manufacturing cocaine base and conspiring to manufacture and
distribute cocaine base. The Government argued that these convictions
were relevant to prove identity and intent.47 Without addressing the
fact that the prior convictions were for possession and the charged
offense was for manufacturing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
convictions were properly admitted to prove intent.48 However, the
convictions were not relevant to prove identity.49 This is because Rule
404(b) allows the admission of evidence to prove identity only if the
extrinsic and charged offenses are so similar that the extrinsic offense
"'marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused.' ""
Moreover, even though the prior convictions were relevant to the issue
of intent, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the possession charges "due to the combined
effect of their remoteness, their factual dissimilarity, and the lack of
prosecutorial need for their introduction."5 1 The convictions occurred
more than fourteen years before the beginning of the charged conspiracy.5 2 Because the extrinsic offenses were for simple possession, they
had limited probative value to prove that the defendant had engaged in
manufacturing drugs.5 3 However, the error was deemed harmless due
to the other overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.5 4

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

216 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 879-80.
See id. at 878-80.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Lail, 846 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879-80.
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ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES

Rather than undertaking the daunting task of formulating rules that
recognize and define various evidentiary privileges, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence have yielded to the courts and allowed the
federal judiciary to formulate rules of privilege in nondiversity cases.55
In diversity cases, state law determines the existence of privileges.56
However, consistent with the general decrease in its evidentiary
decisions, the Eleventh Circuit has not found much cause to formulate
rules of privilege in recent years. Indeed, in his annual survey of
Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions, the Author has not discussed a
privilege decision since the 2003 holding in United States v. Almeida.5 7
However, during the current survey year, the Eleventh Circuit returned
to the issue of privileges, and as discussed below, there have been
developments on the rulemaking front as well.
In Adkins v. Christie,s the plaintiff, a doctor whose privileges had
been terminated at Houston Medical Center in Warner Robins, Georgia,
sued the hospital and others, claiming that the defendants used the peer
review process in a racially discriminatory manner. During discovery,
the plaintiff sought the production of documents relating to the peer
review of all physicians at Houston Medical Center. The defendants
objected, citing Georgia's medical and peer review privileges along with
precedent that broadly shielded discovery of peer review materials in
medical malpractice cases.5" The district court agreed that the peer
review privilege applied to federal civil rights actions. Nevertheless, it
ordered the defendants to provide summaries of peer-reviewed incidents
without producing the documents themselves. Further, the court limited
the scope of its order by requiring disclosure only of peer-reviewed
incidents during a five-year period involving physicians the hospital
deemed similarly situated to the plaintiff. After the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, the plaintiff appealed,
contending that the district court improperly limited the plaintiff's
discovery of the hospital's peer review files.6 °

55.

FED. R. EviD. 501.

56. Id.
57. 341 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). Almeida is discussed by the Author in Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1223-24 (2004).
58. 488 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
59. Id. at 1326-27 (citing O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143 (2006); Emory Clinic v. Houston, 258 Ga.
434, 437, 369 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1988) (per curiam)).
60. Id. at 1327.
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Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the district court improperly held
that federal law recognizes a peer review privilege in discrimination
cases.6 ' Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that all states have
adopted peer review privileges, the court further noted that it had not
yet ruled on whether federal law recognizes a peer review privilege. 2
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to determine whether a peer
review privilege should be recognized.63 The court first acknowledged
that privileges are generally disfavored because they deprive both
litigants and the public of information.'
However, the court agreed
with the defendants that the peer review privilege serves other
important interests. 5 In theory, if doctors and other medical providers
are confident that their complaints and concerns will be confidential,
they will more likely be truthful when discussing the competency and
qualifications of their inept peers.66 Nevertheless, the court held that
the benefit of the peer review privilege must be considered "against a
corresponding and overriding goal-the discovery of evidence essential
to determining whether there has been discrimination in employment."6 7 The court was concise and blunt in its conclusion: "[W]e
conclude that the medical peer review process does not warrant the
extraordinary protection of an evidentiary privilege in federal civil rights
66
cases."
In last year's survey, the Author reported that the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules had proposed a new rule, Rule 502,69 regarding
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.7 ° The Judicial Conference of the
United States subsequently recommended that Congress adopt proposed
Rule 502, and on January 31, 2008, it was approved by the Senate

61. Id.
62. Id. at 1327-28. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have refused to recognize a peer
review privilege. Id. (citing Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Cir.
2001); Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam)).
63. Id. at 1327.
64. Id. at 1328.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1328-29.
68. Id. at 1329.
69. Memorandum from Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 15, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf [hereinafter Evidence Memorandum]
(containing a copy of Proposed Rule of Evidence 502 along with committee notes).
70. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1220-22 (2007).
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Judiciary Committee. 7' As discussed in last year's survey,72 perhaps
the most controversial provision of proposed Rule 502 was "selective
waiver," which would have allowed a party to disclose privileged
information to law enforcement agencies and other governmental entities
without waiving the privilege with regard to other parties.7 3 The
Committee refused to recommend a selective waiver provision:
Unlike inadvertent waivers [addressed in Rule 502], which raise the
costs and burdens of the discovery phase of litigation, an area of great
concern to the rules committees, the selective waiver provision
addresses policy matters, principally the effectiveness of government
investigations, that are largely outside the competence and jurisdiction
of the rules committees.74
Also in September, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States transmitted to Congress
its "report on the Necessity and Desirability of Amending the Federal
Rules of Evidence to Codify a 'Harm to Child' Exception to the Marital
Privileges."75 The report was prepared in connection with a directive
from Congress that the Rules Committee "'study the necessity and
desirability of amending the federal rules of evidence to provide that the
confidential marital communications privilege and the adverse spousal
privilege shall be inapplicable in any Federal proceeding in which a
spouse is charged with a crime against ...a child.'"7 M The Committee
concluded that no such amendment was necessary, noting that only one
case, United States v. Jarvison,77 had upheld a claim of marital
privilege in a prosecution involving a crime against a child under the
care of one of the spouses.7" In short, the Committee concluded that
Jarvison was an aberration and did not constitute a sufficient split
among the circuits with respect to whether there exists a child-harm

71. Memorandum from Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 15, 2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct0l8/App-C-EV JC-Report_51507.pdf; U.S. Courts,
Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index2.html#sen5O2.
72. Treadwell, supra note 70, at 1220-22.
73. See Evidence Memorandum, supra note 69.
74.

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EXCERPT OF THE REPORT OF THE

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3 (2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct01O8fExcerptST.
Report re EV.pdf [hereinafter EXCERPT].
75. Id. at 5.

76. Id. at 4; see Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
77. 409 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2005).
78. See EXCERPT, supra note 74, at 4-5.
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exception to the spousal privilege to warrant an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence.79
IV. ARTICLE VII. OPINION TESTIMONY

It has been fifteen years since the United States Supreme Court held
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc."° that the Federal
Rules of Evidence preempted the long established "general acceptance"
test for the admissibility of expert opinion."' By setting a new standard for the admission of expert testimony, the Rules dramatically
changed the landscape of trial practice-or, perhaps more accurately,
pretrial practice because Daubert issues are generally fought on an
attrition basis prior to trial. To continue the warfare theme, the
Eleventh Circuit has been a major Daubert battleground. In Joiner v.
General Electric Co.,82 the Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme
Court intended "Daubert to loosen the strictures of [the common law
general acceptance test] and make it easier to present legitimate
conflicting views of experts for the jury's consideration." 3 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Daubert to mean it was no longer necessary for
expert evidence to satisfy the burdensome general acceptance test;
rather, it would be sufficient if the evidence was "scientifically legitimate, and not 'junk science' or mere speculation."' In this vein, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that judges were not to assume the role of
juries and weigh facts. 5 The Eleventh Circuit's reading of Daubert was
perhaps understandable. After all, it was in Daubert that the Supreme
Court rejected pharmaceutical industry concerns that the abandonment
of the general acceptance test would open the door to junk science:
In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about
the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally.
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence....
These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an
uncompromising "general acceptance" test, are the appropriate

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 597.
78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).

83. Id. at 530.
84. Id.
85. Id.

2008]

EVIDENCE

1191

safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards
of Rule 702.86
Of course, as we now know, Daubert was intended to do anything but
lower the threshold of admissibility of expert opinion, and the Supreme
Court quickly reversed the Eleventh Circuit. 7
Indeed, it is well established today that Daubert demands district
judges to rigorously scrutinize expert witnesses, notwithstanding the
apparent capability of jurors to discern the reliable expert testimony
from the unreliable. 8 This notion is perhaps so well established that
during the current survey period there were no noteworthy Eleventh
Circuit Daubert decisions. That is not to say, however, that Daubert
does not continue to have a profound impact. On the contrary, it has
become clear that district courts must scrutinize expert opinion and that
their Daubert rulings enjoy the formidable protection of the abuse of
discretion standard. Thus, the front has simply moved from the
Eleventh Circuit to the district courts. For example, a Westlaw search
of all Georgia district court decisions during 2006 revealed fifty-nine
opinions containing the search term "Federal Rules of Evidence." A
search for decisions or opinions containing "Daubert" yielded thirty-seven
results.
V. ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

Hearsay, once a frequent issue in Eleventh Circuit decisions, appeared
in only one noteworthy decision during the survey period. In United
States v. Vance, 9 the defendant contended that the district court
improperly prevented him from questioning a witness who could
corroborate the defendant's trial testimony by speaking about prior
consistent statements the defendant had made. The defendant, who had
responded to an undercover agent's ruse to attract child molesters,
claimed that he responded to the agent's overtures because he wanted
to help children who were victims of abuse. At trial, the defendant
attempted to question his witness, an acquaintance, about a prior
statement allegedly made by the defendant to the acquaintance." The
district court sustained the government's hearsay objection, and the
defendant's counsel did not offer proof or even suggest to the court a

86. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
87. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997).
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
89. 494 F.3d 985 (11th Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 990-93.
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valid reason for eliciting testimony about this prior statement. 91 That
inaction by the defendant's counsel presented the first problem for the
defendant on appeal. Because there had not been an offer of proof in the
record, the standard of review on appeal was whether the district court
committed plain error.9 2 "Plain error exists 'only where (1) there is an
error; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects the defendant's
substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not harmless; and (4)
the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
93
a judicial proceeding.'"
The Eleventh Circuit held that the testimony at issue clearly
constituted hearsay.9 4 Although the defendant allegedly made the
pretrial statement, it is well established under the Federal Rules of
Evidence that even a party's own prior statement is hearsay unless it is
defined as nonhearsay pursuant to Rule 801.95 The defendant contended that the statement was admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as
a prior consistent statement "'offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
97
or motive."'9 6 However, as discussed in the Author's 2004 survey,
the United States Supreme Court, in Tome v. United States,98 held that
a prior consistent statement is not admissible to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication unless the prior statement was made before the motive to
fabricate arose.9 9 In Vance at the time the defendant talked to his
acquaintance he had already made arrangements with the undercover
agent to travel to the Caribbean to meet with underaged girls for the
purpose of engaging in illegal sexual conduct. ° ° Accordingly, at the
time of his prior statement, it is likely he would have already had a
motive to fabricate the reason for his trip.'0 ' Therefore, the district
court did not commit plain error when it sustained the Government's
objection to the defendant's attempt
to elicit testimony about the
10 2
defendant's out-of-court statement.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 992.
Id. at 993.
Id. (quoting United States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 819 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 993; FED. R. EVID. 801.
Vance, 494 F.3d at 993 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1234-35 (2004).

98.

513 U.S. 150 (1995).

99. Id. at 167; see Treadwell, supra note 97, at 1234-35.
100. Vance, 494 F.3d at 994.
101. Id.
102. Id.

